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1 Since its  emergence in the 1970s,  US environmental  ethics  has always been closely
linked to ecological science. To be more specific, the former tends to draw heavily on
the latter. This close association with ecological science makes environmental ethics a
groundbreaking and highly  stimulating field  of  inquiry.  However  it  also  makes  the
foundation for environmental  ethics more precarious than most of  its  practitioners
would wish it to be. On the one hand, environmental philosophers endeavor to convey
a clear moral message and to provide readers with strong ethical guidelines, while on
the other environmental ethics is, to a large extent, predicated on scientific knowledge
which, in essence, is subject to and driven by change and innovation in the form of new
findings.  The upshot is  that the edifice of  environmental ethics rests on precarious
grounds, on a shifting foundation that can radically undermine the moral prescriptions
issued by environmental philosophers. The purpose of this article is to examine how
environmental philosophers come to grips with this tension by taking J. Baird Callicott
as a case-study.
2 J. Baird Callicott, one of the founders of environmental philosophy (Becher 139), taught
the first course on environmental ethics at the University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point
in 1971. His fifty-year academic career has resulted in a myriad of articles and seminal
books, including In Defense of  the Land Ethic:  Essays in Environmental Philosophy (1989), 
Beyond the Land Ethic: More Essays in Environmental Philosophy (1999) and, more recently,
Thinking Like a Planet: The Land Ethic and the Earth Ethic (2013). He remains a major figure,
both admired and criticized for his work in US environmental circles, especially for the
central role he has performed in the questioning of the notion of wilderness. One of his
most significant contributions remains his steadfast commitment to, and interpretation
of, Aldo Leopold’s land ethic (1966).
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3 Change and mutability are central to Leopold’s thinking, and thus to Callicott’s. Both
try to convince their contemporaries that the mutability of ecosystems should be taken
into consideration when it comes to defining norms of human behavior. In order for
them to act morally,  communities need to acknowledge their membership of larger
“land  communities”,  characterized  by  Darwinian  change  and  constant  adaptation.
Callicott  argues  that  a  radical  paradigm  shift  away  from  modernity  and  toward  a
reconstructive postmodern philosophy, informed by Darwinism, ecology and quantum
theory, is a necessity, if the land ethic is to bring about significant change and become
conventional  wisdom.  Ironically,  however,  Callicott’s  emphasis  on  change  and
mutability may also contain the seeds of the destruction of the ethic thus propounded,
as exemplified by the impact of disturbance ecology on the land ethic and Callicott’s
defense of land ethic. Mutability is therefore a concept that is ripe with opportunities
and with challenges: both a sine qua non and a threat.
 
New Developments in the Meaning of Community
4 Leopold’s land ethic was expounded in A Sand County Almanac, published posthumously
in  1949  (Leopold  1966).  Initially  employed  as  a  forester  in  the  tradition  of  Gifford
Pinchot’s  utilitarian  conservation,  Leopold  (1887-1948)  gradually  changed  his
perspective on the nature of man’s relationship with nature and on the meaning of
conservation. Ecological science and Darwinism led him to conceive of the land as a
community  made  up  of  interrelated  parts,  heavily  dependent  on  one  another  and
which thus form a coherent whole. Accordingly, the land ethic blurs the distinction
between mankind and the rest of nature. For Leopold, man is part and parcel of nature,
not a radically distinct entity. Leopold echoes Darwin, who had envisioned an extension
of ethics in The Descent of Man (59-60). Leopold contends that the scope of ethics has
gradually widened as humans have come to regard themselves as members not just of a
family but also of a tribe, a region and a nation. In A Sand County Almanac, Leopold takes
Darwin’s  extension  of  ethics  a  step  further  by  stating  that  ethics  should  now also
encompass whole ecosystems:1
The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils,
waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land… In short, a land ethic changes
the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to plain member
and citizen of it. It implies respect for his fellow-members, and also respect for the
community as such. (239-40)
5 This extension of ethics led Leopold to a new moral maxim which, he hoped, would lay
the groundwork for a more enlightened relationship between human communities and
other living beings: “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability
and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.” (262) J. Baird
Callicott  has  been  trying  to  convey  Leopold’s  ecocentric  message  to  his  fellow
philosophers and to broader audiences since the 1970s.
6 Callicott endorses the land ethic, thereby eliminating Cartesian dualism which draws a
clear line between nature and civilization as well as between the human species and the
rest  of  nature:  “I  follow Darwin in thinking that human culture is  continuous with
primate and mammalian proto-culture and that, no matter how hypertrophic it may
lately have become, contemporary human civilization remains embedded in nature.”
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(Great New Wilderness 388) For Callicott, it is implicit that to embrace Darwin’s teachings
about evolution entails the re-examination of the role of the human species in nature.
7 Aldo  Leopold  was  both  a  professional  conservationist  and  a  professor  of  game
management, he was not a philosopher, however. This explains, in part, why Callicott
endeavored to elevate the land ethic to the intellectual plane of philosophy. He felt no
qualms about conceding the philosophical limitations of the land ethic as expounded in
Leopold’s work (Beyond Land Ethic 60). In his attempt to bring philosophical credibility
to the concept of land ethic, he turned to David Hume and Adam Smith, since both
thinkers had claimed that sympathy is the fountainhead of moral sentiments.
8 Callicott refers mainly to Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the
Principles of Morals. According to Hume, man is instinctively able to determine whether
an action is morally reprehensible or not. His moral sense is therefore shaped by his
emotions and instincts, rather than by reason (Hume 297-98). Sympathy and altruism
are intrinsically human, rather than social constructs (305),  which enables Hume to
assert that man is not merely selfish. The pursuit of self-interest, Hume argues, is not
sufficient to give a full explanation of the roots of human behavior. Hume is however
also quick to point out the limits of human sympathy (384).
9 Callicott  draws  on  Hume’s  theories  in  the  formulation  of  his  own  ecocentric
philosophy.2 In the process, he attempts to demonstrate that Darwinism, Aldo Leopold’s
land ethic and his own thinking are all indebted to Hume. The influence of Hume’s and
Adam Smith’s theories of moral sentiments is evident in Darwin’s The Descent of Man
(1871). Several decades later, Callicott claims, Darwin’s application of evolution to the
human species was to shape Leopold’s ethical reflections, which are now the basis of
Callicott’s philosophy. Callicott’s interest in Hume thus informs two crucial trends in
his thinking: the primacy of moral sentiments and the superiority of communitarian
obligations over individualism (Thinking 9).
10 Thanks to Hume’s philosophy and Aldo Leopold’s land ethic, Callicott is able to present
his own account of the origins of human morality:
(1)  we  (i.e.,  all  psychologically  normal  people)  are  endowed with  certain  moral
sentiments (sympathy, concern for others, and so on) for our fellows, especially for
our kin; (2) modern biology treats Homo sapiens (a), as, like all other living species, a
product of the process of organic evolution; and hence, (b) people are literally kin
(because of common ancestry) to all other contemporary forms of life; (3) therefore,
if so enlightened, we should feel and thus behave […] toward other living things in
ways similar to the way we feel and thus behave toward our human kin. (125)
11 In the same way that Darwinism forms the scientific bedrock for the land ethic, Hume’s
emphasis on moral sentiments constitutes the philosophical cornerstone of Callicott’s
ethical propositions.3
12 According to Callicott, the broader the range of moral patients in a given community,
the more ethically sophisticated the community (Nelson 252-3). His dedication to an
enlarged vision of community, including ecosystems, puts him at odds with the many
branches  of  ethics  that  are  predicated  on  individualism.  As  Callicott  himself
acknowledges, she who commits herself to the land ethic “will […] be a far cry from the
hard-edged, disengaged, dislocated individual of the Modern Western liberal tradition.”
(Beyond Land Ethic 314) The perception of the self as a completely autonomous and self-
sufficient entity fuels the well-entrenched philosophical ideas that Callicott is eager to
displace.  The  notion  of  the  self  as  an  independent  monad  is  a  physical  and
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psychological impossibility. It makes no sense from the perspective of ecology, which
places a premium on interconnections and interdependences, hence Callicott’s call for
a radical transformation in our understanding of community and individuality.
13 Callicott  is  optimistic  about  the  ability  of  moral  sentiments  and  communitarian
solidarities to evolve and broaden. He even thinks that the history of ethics is on his
side:  “The  moral  sentiments  are  undetermined  and  open-ended.  We  can learn  to
respect things today, such as universal human rights and animal rights, our nation-
states, and our biotic communities, of which our remote ancestors knew nothing when
the human moral sentiments were evolving.” (Ouderkirk 298)In other words, today’s
community will not necessarily be identical to tomorrow’s community. The mutability
and  the  protean  character  of  community  as  a  notion  offer  opportunities  for  the
proponents of the land ethic.
14 Callicott’s broadening of community coincides with a broadening of the human self,
which  bears  a  close  resemblance  to  Arne  Naess’s  deep  ecological  notion  of  Self-
realization:4
[…] oneself and other persons (which certainly would not exclude other animals)
are nodes or nexuses in a skein of relationships —relationships with organisms both
internal  and  external  to  one’s  superecosystem.  Through  one’s  superecosystem
circulate water, various materials (both nutritious and poisonous) and the biogenic
air. The material world, both in form of inert matter and living matter […] crosses
the fuzzy and penetrable boundaries of the superecosystem that is oneself. Through
the pores of one’s skin, on the air one breathes into one’s lungs, in the water one
drinks, and in the food one eats. (Naess 111)
15 Callicott believes that a human being is much more than a body and self-interest. The
self can only be understood properly in the larger context of the multiple communities
to  which it  belongs  — family,  region,  nation,  party,  ideology,  biotic  community,  to
name only a few. Such a broad and elastic vision of the self is bound to seem excessive
to many modern philosophers, which is not surprising since Callicott’s ambition is to
precipitate the dawn of a postmodern age which will transcend modern individualism.
 
The Need for a Shift in Paradigms
16 Callicott’s  entire  philosophical  endeavor  is  predicated  on  the  simple  notion  that  a
radical change in worldview is required for his contemporaries to solve the tremendous
environmental challenges of the 21st century. No solution will be found as long as a
great paradigm shift, to paraphrase Thomas Kuhn to whom Callicott explicitly refers,
does not come to pass (Beyond Land Ethic 302). In fact, Callicott is convinced that the
great paradigm shift is already underway and that modernity is doomed to disappear.
17 Callicott regularly proclaimed the end of the modern idea of nature (1992: 16), which
originated in the scientific revolution of the 17th century with Descartes, Newton, and
Bacon,  among  others.  This  idea  of  nature  is  inherently  linked  to  a  fundamental
dichotomy between man and nature, subject and object, mind and body. Catherine and
Raphaël Larrère see this approach as conducive to a radical subjugation of nature by
human science and technology, since nature is perceived as “shorn of all mystery and
enchantment,  and  as  a  created  entity  that  can  be  disposed  of  and  manipulated.”
(Larrère 58-9, my translation) Callicott asserts that despite the prestige and appeal of
the modern idea of nature, its scientific justification no longer holds much weight.
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18 In  the  second  half  of  the  19th century  and  in  the  early  20 th century,  Darwinism,
ecological  science  and  the  theory  of  relativity  threatened  to  discredit  Cartesian
dualism. The tenets of Darwinism invalidated the notion that the human species is in
essence  radically  different  from  others;  ecology  insists  on  the  centrality  of  the
interaction and interdependence found in nature, as epitomized by ecosystems. The
theory of relativity makes it impossible to posit a sharp and fundamental separation
between  subjects  and  objects  (Callicott  1989:  165-6).  Callicott  argues  that  these
scientific developments have fatally undermined modernity:
Ecology is not just an arcane sub-discipline of biology. Like the theory of evolution,
it is pregnant with vast philosophical implications. Indeed, ecology, along with the
theory of evolution and relativity and quantum theory in physics, is propelling a
sea change in the Western world view, a paradigm shift […] I would go further still
and suggest that ours could be one of those moments in history […] that come but
rarely in human cultural development: a moment in history not unlike the Golden
Age of Greece when Western art, literature, philosophy, and democracy were born;
or Renaissance Europe when Modern Science and technology began to take shape.
(Beyond Land Ethic 287)
19 Thus,  the  modern  worldview,  Callicott  contends,  is  a  losing  proposition  which
continues to shape human affairs, and which is one of the great paradoxes of our time.
To his mind, the modern worldview is therefore doomed to be replaced and superseded
by a new worldview. The relevant question is to determine when it will happen.
20 Unsurprisingly,  Callicott’s  call  for  a  postmodern  vision  of  nature  came  in  for
considerable criticism in environmental circles, especially because of his attack on the
notion  of  wilderness  as  it  helps  perpetuate  the  anti-ecological nature/civilization
dichotomy.  Callicott  was  accused  of  condoning  the  adversaries  of  environmental
protection, by providing them with arguments to the effect that nature is a myth and
therefore  need not  be  protected (Callicott  2008:  351-4).  Such accusations  prompted
Callicott to clarify his position: 
Note that my Darwinian-Leopoldian naturalization of culture is opposite the stance
of other postmodern environmental philosophers who culturize […] nature. They
argue  that  nature  is  culturally  (or  socially)  constructed,  whereas I  argue  that
culture is naturally evolved and remains a part of nature. (Ouderkirk 300)
21 Callicott’s  approach  to  the  origins  of  ethics  allows  him  to  eliminate  this  dualism,
without endangering the justification for ethics:  natural  evolution has provided the
human species with a moral sense, according to Darwin, Leopold, and Callicott. It is
therefore possible for the human species to see itself as part of nature and therefore to
treat nature morally.
22 Callicott  appears  almost  desperate to  dissociate  himself  from deconstructionism,  or
French theory. He wants to cast himself as a postmodern philosopher, while insisting
that  his  ethical  propositions  will  not  lead  to  a  relativistic  dead  end:  “Absent  a
comprehensive and culturally shared new myth, we are left with plural points of view,
perspectives, multiple outlooks — each of which has an equal class on truth” (Beyond
Land Ethic 161), so much so that Callicott faults Jacques Derrida and Richard Rorty for
spreading a nihilistic message (163). He even bemoans the advent of the “new Dark
Ages  of  deconstructive  différance,  without  even  the  minimum  methodological
agreements  required  for  resolving  differences  of  opinion  by  informed  reasoned
argument.” (165) Callicott’s statements regarding Derrida testify more to his desire to
avoid being seen as a postmodern enemy of environmental protection than to an in-
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depth knowledge of Derrida’s actual philosophy, which is far from being antithetical to
environmental  awareness  (Clark).  Callicott’s  main  concern  is  to  avoid  promoting
deconstructive theories which, he argues, may turn out merely to be destructive.
23 A dominant paradigm is not only necessary in and of itself. Callicott contends that it is
furthermore  desirable.  He  considers  his  interpretation  of  postmodernism  to  be
reconstructive, since its function is not to liquidate all worldviews, but rather to help
mankind embrace a renewed one, predicated on the lessons of Darwinism, ecology, and
the New Physics:  “If  Western philosophy played a major role in the creation of the
prevailing dualistic mechanistic Western worldview, then Western philosophy would
seem to have a major role to play in deconstructing it, and in reconstructing a new
ecological-organic worldview.” (Beyond Land Ethic 39) The fact that postmodernism can
be defined in many different ways (Rey 63) makes it easier for Callicott to lay claim to
it.
24 Change or mutation brought about by a scientific paradigm shift is factor which creates
philosophical opportunities, as demonstrated by Callicott’s blueprint for an ecocentric
postmodern age, although it also begets what is an unstable state for ethics. The fruits
of future scientific research are at best uncertain. The emphasis laid on change and on
scientific developments which is at the heart of Callicott’s ethic may contain the seeds
its very destruction.
 
The Ecology of Chaos vs the Land Ethic
25 Callicott has repeatedly proclaimed the superiority of the scientific method: “Before
any critical experiments are designed, a scientific theory is brought before the tribunal
of the logical law of noncontradiction. Scientific narratives are likely to be internally
more consistent than other alternatives, and therefore, more tenable.” (Callicott 2001:
91)  Self-correction  is  what  sets  the  scientific  method  inherited  from  the  scientific
revolution apart from other epistemological  approaches.  Furthermore, the scientific
method is highly responsive to the evolution of human experience. Callicott’s emphasis
on the role of science is all the more crucial insofar as “the facts of ecological science
yield the oughts of the land ethic.” (Ouderkirk 40) This, however, has prompted some of
Callicott’s detractors to affirm that ecology is too unstable a field to serve as a reliable
foundation  for  ethics  (239).  The  main  weakness  in  Callicott’s  ethical  apparatus
undoubtedly lies in the unending capacity of the scientific method to call into question
the state of accepted knowledge, as was made evident by the challenge to the land ethic
brought about by the advent of disturbance ecology.
26 In the 1970s, ecological research began to stray away from the principles which had
defined it since the mid-20th century. As epitomized in the work of American scientist
Eugene E.  Odum, ecology had hitherto revolved around the notions of  stability  and
harmony. Yet it was not long before this vision of undisturbed and self-perpetuating
ecosystems was questioned and replaced by disturbance ecology and the nature-in-flux
paradigm. Change and disruption, rather than stability and harmony, were thus to be
apprehended as the driving force behind ecosystems, if indeed these even existed in
the  first  place.  The  historian  Donald  Worster  introduced  and  discussed  the  main
features of what he called the ecology of chaos, in his article “The Ecology of Order and
Chaos” (1990):
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We  look  for  cooperation  in  nature  and  we  find  only  competition.  We  look  for
organized wholes, and we can discover only loose atoms and fragments. We hope
for order and discern only a mishmash of conjoining species, all seeking their own
advantage in utter disregard of others. (Worster 9)
27 The upshot is that it now makes less ecological sense to define ecosystem health as
stability  and  for  the  analyst  or  observer  to  systematically  regard  disruption  and
stochastic change as unwanted and necessarily harmful. To make matters even worse,
from the Leopoldian viewpoint, ecosystems whose relevancy can be questioned, have at
best ill-defined boundaries, a feature which undermines the case for studying them as
self-sufficient and self-regulating entities.
28 S.T.A.  Pickett  and  P.S.  White  note,  in  their  introduction  to  The  Ecology  of  Natural
Disturbance and Patch Dynamics (1987), the seminal book on disturbance ecology, that
“equilibrium landscapes would […] seem to be the exception, rather than the rule.”
(Pickett  and  White  5)  While  by  no  means  downplaying  the  ability  of  ecological
researchers to understand their natural environment, Pickett and White focus on the
need to pay more attention to the central role of natural disturbances:
A systematic and comprehensive approach to the study of disturbance is essential,
given  its  primary  role  and  the  inherent  complexity  of  disturbance  types  and
impacts. Without such an approach, ecologists will continue to catalog disturbance
patterns and biological responses with little hope of comprehension emerging from
the chaos. (165)
29 It should come as no surprise that the impact of disturbance ecology extended well
beyond the confines  of  scientific  research and has  had an effect  on environmental
ethics  as  well.  The  emergence  of  disturbance  ecology  brings  to  the  fore  several
inconvenient questions regarding the land ethic: does it still make sense to refer to a
land  ethic,  when  dealing  with  natural  phenomena  which  are  liable  to  sudden  and
unpredictable radical  change? How can consideration be granted to natural entities
whose boundaries resist precise definition? Callicott confronted these questions head-
on, writing extensively on disturbance ecology (Callicott 2009: 177-93).
30 Callicott integrated disturbance ecology within an updated version of the land ethic. He
did  so  by  way  of  a  distinction  between  two  kinds  of  perturbation,  one  that  is
consubstantial to the functioning of ecosystems and, as such, does not clash with biotic
integrity, whereas the other, stemming from large-scale technological and industrial
development,  is  unnecessary,  destructive  and  is  therefore  unethical.  Scale  is  the
criterion adopted here, in order to determine whether the changes at work in a given
ecosystem are beyond the pale of the land ethic. The instability resulting from techno-
industrial development is of such great magnitude that it becomes essentially different
from other non-anthropic disturbances:
In general, frequent, intense disturbances, such as tornadoes, occur at small, widely
distributed spatial scales. And spatially broadcast disturbances, such as droughts,
occur less  frequently.  And most disturbances at  whatever level  of  intensity and
scale  are  stochastic  (random)  and  chaotic  (unpredictable).  The  problem  with
anthropogenic perturbations —such as industrial forestry and agriculture, exurban
development,  drift  net  fishing,  and  such—  is  that  they  are  far  more  frequent,
widespread,  and  regularly  occurring  than  are  nonanthropogenic  perturbations.
(Beyond Land Ethic 136-137)
31 Not  all  changes  are  identical.  From  the  perspective  of  the  land  ethic,  some
perturbations are accepted, while others are not, man-made climate change being a
case in point. Relying on the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate change,
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Callicott revised and updated Leopold’s land ethic in order to make it compliant with
disturbance ecology: “A thing is right when it tends to disturb the biotic community
only at normal spatial and temporal scales. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.” (138)
32 Science remains central both to Callicott’s ethical reflections and to the vulnerability of
his  ethical  propositions  regarding  the  unstable  and  volatile  state  of  scientific
knowledge. The land ethic is scientifically driven. It is therefore highly responsive to
contemporary  developments  and  is  thus  able  to  address  new  challenges.  It  may
however  also  be  considered to  be  unreliable  and ever-shifting,  as  a  foundation for
ethical guidelines. Whether this uncertainty will appeal to Callicott’s contemporaries
remains a moot point.
 
Conclusion
33 Callicott has compelling reasons to believe that modernity is about to be displaced.
Faced however with the many challenges of climate change, the depletion of natural
resources  due  to  unsustainable  global  economic  growth  and  the  ongoing  mass
extinction of species that is occurring worldwide, the question as to whether modernity
will morph into Callicott’s ecocentric worldview or move towards the creation of an
increasingly  artificialized  environment  is  a  moot  point.  Callicott’s  optimistic  view
suggests  the  advent  of  a  global  and  multicultural  convergence  toward  a  non-
anthropocentric  consensus,  informed  by  the  postmodern  scientific  vision  (Callicott
1997: xiv-v).  Others, who are as concerned as he is with our current environmental
predicament, argue that the pervasive influence of human action on the biosphere may
lead mankind to try to control nature even more, if only to address the problems it has
created.  Yuval  Harari  (448-51)  has  recently  described  the  huge  potential  of
biotechnologies for the 21st century, while geoengineering is sometimes touted as a
credible means through which to address climate change. According to this vision, the
influence  of  global  industrial  civilization  on  the  biosphere  is  considered  to  have
become so deep and so far-ranging that the only viable option remaining is that of
further  control  through science  and  technology.  By  contrast,  Callicott’s  alternative
vision amounts to a radical rejection of the continuation of the Cartesian narrative.
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NOTES
1. Ecosystem as a notion is attributed to British scientist Arthur Tansley in 1935. Tansley and
Leopold knew each other, and their ideas were close intellectually.
2. There is an element of irony to Callicott’s use of Hume’s philosophy. The philosophers who
attempt to derive ethical norms from the observation of natural phenomena are often accused of
committing  the  so-called  naturalistic  fallacy,  which  Hume  is  said  to  have  conceptualized.
According to this view, science can shed light on the laws of nature, but cannot convey any moral
message. Ethics, in other words, cannot be grounded in nature, because nature merely exists,
without  heeding  moral  considerations  (for  a  more  detailed  introduction  to  the  naturalistic
fallacy, see Hess 99 and DesJardins 169).  In order to address this objection, Callicott turns to
Darwin’s The Descent of Man,  claiming that ethics is merely a by-product of natural evolution.
Thanks to sympathy, which Callicott sees as being consubstantial to human nature, ecological
knowledge gives us a sense of our belonging in nature, which in turn breeds ethical consideration
for nature (for Callicott’s full defense against the naturalistic fallacy charge, see Callicott 2013:
36, 71). As a result, Callicott does not perceive the naturalistic fallacy as an obstacle to his use of
Hume as a philosophical justification for his ethical propositions.
3. Callicott is well aware that Hume could not have been familiar with Darwinism, let alone with
the land ethic. Yet, he argues that linking Hume’s views on the moral sentiments to Leopold’s
ethic does not represent an anachronism, for though moral sentiments only apply to human
beings  in  Hume’s  work,  their  scope  can  be  updated  and  enlarged  in  the  light  of  scientific
developments that occurred after Hume’s death. In effect, what Callicott does is to explore new
territory by extending Hume’s theory to non-human entities.
4. In Naess’s work, Self-realization is consubstantial to the rejection of Cartesian dualism and to
the  integration  of  the  human  into  the  nonhuman.  Naess  contends  that  awareness  of  the
ontological bond between the human species and nonhuman life can come about in ways that
differ from one individual to another (Gestalt formation). (60-61) These various processes lead to
the flourishing of a new conception of the self in harmony with the spirit of Deep Ecology. Eric
Katz calls it “an expanded self-identifying with the natural world.” (Katz 25)
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ABSTRACTS
This  article  analyzes  the  ideas  of  American  philosopher  J. Baird  Callicott  to  shed  light  on
ecological  thinking  and  its  inherent  commitment  to  change  and  the  adaptation  of  US
environmental ethics. Callicott is one of the most prominent and longest-serving practitioners of
environmental ethics; he is especially known for his support of land ethic, as defined by Aldo
Leopold, and ecocentrism, an ethic predicated on the perception of ecosystems as communities.
Callicott  draws  on  the  works  of  David  Hume,  Adam  Smith  and  Charles  Darwin  to  justify  a
Leopoldian  ecocentrism.  Extending  Hume’s  and  Smith’s  theory  of  moral  sentiments  to  non-
human life and ecosystems, Callicott claims to have continued Darwin’s ethical reflections in The
Descent  of  Man  (1871),  also  taken  up  by  Aldo  Leopold  after  his  conversion  to  the  ecological
worldview. Callicott argues that the meaning of community can and must be protean, in order to
ensure that environmental destruction will not continue unimpeded. Callicott thus calls for a
major paradigm shift away from modernity, as defined by the scientific revolution of the 17th
century,  to  a  reconstructive  postmodernity  informed  by  Darwinism,  ecology  and  the  “new”
physics spawned by quantum theory. According to Callicott, the only effective way to transcend
Cartesian dualism is to bring about a major change in people’s worldview. Short of such a shift in
paradigms, the dualities at the root of the environmental crisis will persist. Ironically, one of the
main challenges to Callicott’s defense of the land ethic came from within ecology, from what
Donald  Worster calls  the  ecology  of  chaos.  If  Callicott  rescues  Leopold’s  land  ethic  from
ecological insignificance, this is because of the advent of disturbance ecology in the 1970s and
1980s along with the gradual replacement of the balance-of-nature paradigm by the nature-in-
flux paradigm. How can ecosystems be considered communities if they are subject to stochastic
and  catastrophic  change?  Distinguishing  the  scale  of  non-human  change  and  anthropogenic
change, Callicott salvages an ethic whose ecological foundations are precarious and unstable. In
doing so, he demonstrates that just as adaptation is part of a natural evolution, it is also the key
to  intellectual  and  philosophical  evolution.  Callicott’s  response  to  disturbance  ecology
nevertheless highlights the precarious position of  environmental  philosophers who predicate
their moral prescriptions on scientific knowledge, given that the science of ecology is always
evolving.
Cet article vise à éclairer l’influence de la pensée écologique, et tout particulièrement de notions
telles  que  le  changement  et  la  mutation,  sur  l’éthique  environnementale  aux  États-Unis  en
analysant l’œuvre de J. Baird Callicott, aujourd’hui l’un des philosophes de l’environnement les
plus influents outre-Atlantique. Callicott a dédié une part considérable de sa carrière à la mise en
avant de l’éthique du vivant (land ethic) créée par Aldo Leopold au milieu du 20e siècle. Afin de
donner  ses  lettres  de  noblesse  philosophiques  à  la  proposition  éthique  de  Leopold,  Callicott
s’appuie  notamment  sur  David  Hume,  Adam  Smith  et  Charles  Darwin :  en  appliquant  aux
écosystèmes et aux espèces non-humaines les théories des sentiments moraux de Hume et de
Smith,  Callicott  affirme ne faire que poursuivre un processus commencé par Darwin dans La
Filiation de l’homme et développé par Aldo Leopold dans son Almanach d’un comté des sables. Selon
Callicott, l’élargissement du sens que l’espèce humaine confère aux liens communautaires est une
nécessité impérieuse face à la multiplication des défis environnementaux. Callicott en vient à
préconiser l’avènement d’un changement de paradigme, qui devra conduire l’humanité à adhérer
à  une  « modernité  déconstructrice »  informée  par  le  darwinisme,  la  science  écologique  et
l’apport  de  la  physique  quantique.  Callicott  espère  que  cette  transition  conduira  au
remplacement  du  dualisme  cartésien  entre  l’espèce  humaine  et  la  nature  par  une  vision
écocentriste  du monde en vertu de laquelle  l’espèce humaine se  conçoit  comme intégrée au
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vivant et non comme radicalement différente de lui. Pourtant, c’est la science écologique elle-
même qui fragilise le plus les propositions éthiques de Callicott à travers l’apparition, à la fin des
années  1970,  de  ce  que  l’historien  Donald  Worster  a  appelé  l’écologie  du  chaos.  L’attention
grandissante  que  les  écologues  apportent  alors  aux perturbations  et  à  l’instabilité  du  vivant
contraint  le  philosophe  à  faire  évoluer  l’éthique  léopoldienne  en  insistant  sur  le  caractère
discriminant  de  l’échelle  des  perturbations :  par  la  rapidité  et  l’ampleur  des  dégâts  qu’elles
provoquent, certaines perturbations d’origine anthropique ne sont pas moralement acceptables.
Le parcours philosophique de Callicott démontre ainsi l’importance de la capacité d’adaptation
dans l’évolution intellectuelle et philosophique. Mais il souligne aussi la situation précaire des
philosophes  de  l’environnement  qui  fondent  leurs  prescriptions  morales  sur  des  savoirs
scientifiques. Ces savoirs jouissent d’un grand prestige depuis la révolution scientifique mais ils
sont par nature toujours susceptibles d’évoluer.
INDEX
Mots-clés: Callicot J. Baird, éthique de l’environnement, éthique du vivant, écocentrisme,
anthropocentrisme, écologie
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